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A theoretical analysis of national decision-
making and intemation influence in terms
of decision theory has been made recently
by several political scientists, including
Singer (1963), Glenn Snyder (1960), and
Russett (1963). In fact, theoretical analy-
sis in the language of decision theory
seems increasingly widespread among po-
litical scientists and other social scientists
concerned with international affairs.
This paper discusses a number of diffi-
culties in the use of decision theory for ac-
tual research on national decision-making.
It also discusses a modification of the de-
cision-theory approach which may make
easier the actual measurement of theoretical
variables relevant to decision-making.1-
The Use of Decision Theory to
Study International Influence
First, let us look at the way in which de-
cision theory has been used by students of
international relations. Conceptualization
of the behavior of national decision-makers
in terms of decision theory is expressed by
Singer in the following words:
Having examined the varieties of influence
situations, we should notice one other consid-
eration prior to evaluating the range of tech-
niques available to the influencer in these situ-
ations. This is the influencee’s decisional cal-
culus : the abstract dimensions upon which
he (i.e., those individuals who, alone or to-
gether, act on behalf of the target nation)
weighs a range of conceivable outcomes in any
influence situation. For every outcome which
any decision-maker can conceive of as possible,
there are at least two such dimensions. The
degree to which he likes or dislikes the prospect
is called the utility or disutility, and the likeli-
hood which he assigns to its ever occurring is
called the probability. Both of these are, of
course, subjective variables: preferences and
predictions of the influencee.
In the abstract, the combined judgments
which the influencee makes along both of
these dimensions will determine his contingent
expectations and thus his response to the in-
fluence attempt [1963, p. 424].
A widely used hypothesis of decision
theory states that people will maximize their
expected utility. Expected utility of ac-
tion 1 is represented by the equation:
1 I am indebted to Jerald Bachman, Dorwin
Cartwright, Ward Edwards, Clinton Fink,
Bruce Russett, J. David Singer, and Glenn
Snyder for helpful comments on earlier drafts
of this paper. Of course, the author alone is
responsible for the views presented.
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EU1= (UaXPa) + (UbXPb) ....+
(Un X Pn)
where: EU = expected utility
Ua, Ub, ... , Un are the subjective util-
ities2 of the possible
outcomes ( a, b,... n )
of action 1.
Pa, Pb,..., Pn are the subjective prob-
abilities of each of the
possible outcomes ( a,
b,... n ) occurring as
a result of action 1.
According to the maximization hypothe-
sis, a decision-maker will choose action 1
over action 2 when E U1 > EU2’
This &dquo;maximization of expected utility&dquo;
principle has been used by Singer to ac-
count for national reactions to threats and
to promises of reward.3 Glenn Snyder and
Russett use this decision theory approach
to analyze the success of attempts by one
nation to deter aggression by another na-
tion. These analyses have so far been of
a discursive rather than an empirical type.
While no one has (to my knowledge) ac-
tually attempted to measure specific utilities
and probabilities in an international situa-
tion, several writers have used utility-prob-
ability notions as a general guide for their
empirical work.4 4
Decision theory has an appealing theoret-
ical elegance when applied to the disci-
pline of international relations, which has
lacked rigorous theory. Moreover, it seems
intuitively to fit what we know about na-
tional decision-making fairly well. Presi-
dents and premiers do sit down with their
advisers and weigh alternatives, consider
possible outcomes of action, implicitly or
explicitly assign utilities to these outcomes,
and try to assess the probabilities that vari-
ous outcomes will follow a given action.
Yet there have been reservations and
doubts raised about the usefulness of de-
cision theory for understanding the actions
of national decision-makers. Two major is-
sues have been raised. The first concerns
the question of how &dquo;rational&dquo; decision-
makers actually are. The second concerns
the operational problems of trying to mea-
sure the decision-makers’ subjective utilities
and subjective probabilities. As we shall
see, these issues are interrelated.
The Question of Rationality in
Decision-Making
Concerning the assumption of &dquo;rational-
ity&dquo; in decision-making, some cautions come
from the same political scientists who have
made use of decision theory as a theoretical
model. Singer suggests that under certain
circumstances-e.g., under conditions of
threat and anxiety-decision-makers may
not act &dquo;rationally,&dquo; i.e., will not try to max-
imize the product of utility and probability
(Singer, 1963, pp. 428-30).
Glenn Snyder also acknowledges that na-
tional decision-makers may act &dquo;irrationally,&dquo;
noting that: &dquo;Irrationality may take the
form either of failing to act in accordance
with one’s best estimate of costs, gains, and
probabilities, or of faulty calculation of
these factors in the light of the evidence
available&dquo; (G. Snyder, 1960, p. 174).
The source of some of the &dquo;irrationality&dquo;
of behavior is suggested in a comment by
Morton Deutsch. In discussing the assump-
tions behind the theory of stable deterrence,
he says: &dquo;Behavior, particularly in a time
of high tension and crisis, is more likely to
2 Since the term "utility" refers to subjective
value, the term subjective utility is, strictly
speaking, redundant. However, since the sub-
jective nature of the variables is important for
this discussion, it is hoped that the redundancy
will be tolerated for the sake of greater clarity.
3 A number of different types of decision
models have now been developed. For a re-
view of these, see Edwards (1961).
4 See, for example, Alan Whiting’s book on
the Chinese decision to enter the Korean war
(Whiting, 1960, p. ix).
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be determined by anxiety, stereotypes, self-
esteem defense maneuvers, and social con-
formity pressures, than by simple rational
estimates of economic loss and gain&dquo;
(Deutsch, 1961, p. 64).
A number of investigators have been ex-
plicitly concerned with whether people do
in fact make choices &dquo;rationally&dquo;-i.e., in
accord with the utility multiplied by the
probability of each outcome. These investi-
gators have noted the intrusion of person-
ality and other &dquo;nonrational&dquo; factors. Brim
and his associates (1962) studied choices
made by parents among ways of handling
child-raising problems (e.g., not doing
homework; masturbation). They report
that their subjects did generally choose in
accordance with the &dquo;maximization of ex-
pected utility (utility X probability)&dquo; hy-
pothesis. However, certain subjects did not
choose &dquo;rationally&dquo;-i.e., in accord with
their indicated utilities and probabilities-
in selecting a course of action for the mas-
turbation problem. The authors suggest
that this is because these people are more
&dquo;emotional&dquo; about the masturbation prob-
lem. The Brim study also indicates some
association-though not a powerful one-
between &dquo;rationality&dquo; of choice and such
personality factors as belief in the predict-
ability of life. In addition, this study indi-
cates that decisions made by groups are
more likely to approximate the utility-prob-
ability model than are decisions made by
individuals.
Scodel, Ratoosh, and Minas (1959) found
in a laboratory study of gambling choices
that people who differ in need for achieve-
ment and in fear of failure will choose dif-
ferent combinations of payoff and probabil-
ity. For example, people with high need
for achievement chose bets of intermediate
probability (and moderate payoff) more of-
ten than did those with low need for
achievement.
Further suggestion of the importance of
&dquo;irrational&dquo; factors in choice behavior comes
from the work of French and his associates.
In analyzing coercive power, this group
conceptualized the &dquo;induction force&dquo; ex-
erted on an individual in terms of the
&dquo;valence&dquo; of the punishment for noncon-
formity and in terms of the probability that
punishment will follow conformity or non-
conformity. They state that the strength
of the coercive power (induction force) de-
pends upon the magnitude of the negative
valence of the threatened punishment mul-
tiplied by the perceived probability that
the person can avoid the punishment by
conformity (French and Raven, 1959, p.
157). Substitute the word &dquo;utility&dquo; for the
word &dquo;valence&dquo;-a substitution which re-
tains the essential meaning-and the for-
mulation is now closely similar to that of
decision theory. But for French and his
co-workers, following Lewin, this is only
half the story. The other half is the &dquo;re-
sistance force.&dquo; French and Raven state:
&dquo;The direction of the resultant force on P
will depend on the relative magnitude of
the induced force set up by the act of 0,
and the resisting force in the opposite di-
rection which is generated by that same
act&dquo; (p. 152).
The nature of this resistance force is in-
dicated by some of its operational mea-
sures-e.g., agreement or disagreement with
statements like, &dquo;I thought the superior’s
evaluation was unfair&dquo; and &dquo;I resented the
threat of being fired.&dquo; In empirical studies
of coercive power and of coercive power
compared to reward power, French, Mor-
rison, and Levinger (1960) and Zipf (1958)
find resistance to be an important factor
in reducing conformity to influence. But
the concept of resistance stands outside the
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valence-probability framework used to con-
ceptualize the induction force. It there-
fore appears, in the work of French and
his associates, to have the status of an in-
terfering &dquo;irrational&dquo; factor.
Data on the use of threat, reported by
Deutsch and Krauss (1962), seem closely
related to the &dquo;resistance&dquo; phenomenon
studied by French’s group.
Now what are the implications of these
data on &dquo;irrational&dquo; factors for the use of
decision theory? It may be noted first that
the term &dquo;rational&dquo; as applied to various
influences on decision-making may be mis-
leading. There is really nothing less sen-
sible, or reasonable, about trying to increase
one’s sense of self-esteem, or to reduce one’s
feeling of anxiety, than there is about try-
ing to increase the territorial size of one’s
country. In this respect both kinds of mo-
tivation are equally rational.
Secondly, it is not necessary that behav-
ior be rational, in the sense of trying to
maximize practical benefits, in order to be
describable by the hypothesis that people
tend to maximize expected utility. It is
possible for the theorist to consider, for ex-
ample, outcomes like personal prestige,
satisfaction of revenge motives, self-respect,
etc., in the same conceptual terms as the
practical outcomes of a decision. Each of
these nonpragmatic outcomes may have a
certain subjective utility and a certain sub-
jective probability of resulting from a given
decision.
Consciousness of Utilities
There is, however, a very crucial differ-
ence between the nonpragmatic outcomes
and the pragmatic ones. This difference is
that the utility and the subjective probabil-
ity of the nonpragmatic motives are often
totally or partially unconscious. They are
not calculated and considered in the same
way that pragmatic outcomes are.
For example, in Zipf s experiment, the
persons who had, in effect, to decide how
hard to work undoubtedly considered quite
consciously the value of the money re-
wards or fines and their probabilities. It
is very doubtful if these subjects con-
sciously considered the utility and probabil-
ity of such outcomes as &dquo;hurting the boss,&dquo;
maintaining their own self-respect, and ex-
pressing their anger-i.e., the expected
utility of &dquo;resistance.&dquo; It is this difference
in the conscious calculation of utilities and
probabilities that is the important differ-
ence between what has been called the
&dquo;rational&dquo; and the &dquo;irrational&dquo; in decision-
making.
Those who have attempted to understand
international events in terms of decision
theory have recognized that decision-mak-
ers are interested in more than pragmatic
gains like military and trade advantages.
But they have limited their analysis to situ-
ations in which any nonpragmatic motives
are considered in a deliberate and fully
conscious manner. Thus Glenn Snyder
writes:
... &dquo;rationality&dquo; may be defined as choosing
to act in the manner which gives best promise
of maximizing one’s value position, on the basis
of a sober calculation of potential gains and
losses and the probabilities of enemy actions.
This definition is broad enough to allow the
inclusion of such ’emotional’ values as honor,
prestige, and revenge, as legitimate ends of
policy. It may be perfectly rational, in other
words, to be willing to accept some costs
solely to satisfy such emotions; but if such
emotions inhibit a clear-eyed view of the con-
sequences of an act, they may lead to irra-
tional behavior [1960, pp. 173-174].
It is clear from the phrase &dquo;sober calcu-
lation&dquo; in this passage and from many other
passages in Snyder’s article that, while non-
pragmatic utilities can have a place in the
analysis, this place is that of consciously
calculated ends.
168
While Singer does not systematically con-
sider the theoretical place of such utilities
as honor, prestige, and revenge, he appears
also to restrict his analysis to the conscious,
problem-solving aspect of decision-making.
Thus he sees a decision theory analysis as
losing its applicability where the &dquo;prob-
lem-solving capacity&dquo; of the decision-maker
is impaired, as under great stress.
Russett notes the possible importance to
the defender of &dquo;intangible&dquo; values such as
prestige and self-esteem, but states: &dquo;A de-
fender’s decision whether to pursue a ’firm’
policy that risks war will depend upon his
calculation of the value and probability of
various outcomes&dquo; (p. 106). Again the
nonpragmatic values are limited to the
part which they play in conscious calcula-
tion.
While much of the decision-making of
national leaders is undoubtedly based on
conscious calculation of relevant factors,
the experimental studies on decision-making
cited above caution us not to overlook the
role of less conscious factors. It is difficult
to obtain direct evidence concerning the
relative importance of conscious versus
partly-conscious motives for national deci-
sion-makers. But it is not hard to imagine
partly-conscious motives being important
in some international situations.
Take, for example, the value of maintain-
ing self-esteem which, on the basis of ex-
perimental evidence, Deutsch considers im-
portant in accounting for resistance to
threat. A Khrushchev or a Johnson may
coldly calculate the advantages to his na-
tion’s prestige, but does he really con-
sciously assess the possible effects on his
own self-esteem of a successful or unsuc-
cessful move? And how about the potential
effects of a foreign policy move on his own
political fortunes? If he were suitably
Machiavellian, he might indeed be able to
include this fully in his calculations. But
will a Khrushchev or a Johnson or a de
Gaulle fully admit to himself that he may
be willing to take some gamble with the
lives of his countrymen rather than face a
serious political setback? It seems likely
that such considerations of personal ag-
grandizement remain rather shadowy and
semiconscious on the fringes of his mind.
The point is not that the decision-maker
is completely unaware of such motives. It
is rather that, because such motives are
less socially desirable than others, the deci-
sion-maker may not be aware of the magni-
tude of their importance to him. One could
go on to make similar arguments about the
at least partially unconscious role that other
factors may play-such as personal anger,




If, in fact, partly-conscious motives may
play an important part in some national de-
cisions, can such motives be handled by a
decision theory analysis? In terms of the
applicability of decision theory, e.g., of the
hypothesis that people tend to maximize
expected utility-the answer is yes.
The presence of unconscious or partly-
conscious motives does not make invalid
the decision-theory hypothesis. As Fried-
man and Savage (1948) point out, it is
no more necessary for the decision-maker
to consciously maximize all relevant util-
ities and probabilities than it is for the ex-
pert billiard player to be aware of the
mathematical equations which describe his
choice of angles and speeds on the billiard
table. In both cases, it is sufficient that
the observer is able to account for the be-
havior in these theoretical terms-not that
the actor himself be able to explain his be-
havior in those terms.
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However, the presence of partly-con-
scious motives does present formidable dif-
ficulties for decision theory as a tool for
research into and measurement of decision
processes. These methodological difficul-
ties introduced by the presence of partly-
conscious motives complicate what are al-
ready serious practical difficulties of mea-
suring subjective utility and subjective
probability.
Problems of Research and
Measurement Using Decision Theory
To illustrate the methodological prob-
lems attendant on use of decision theory,
let us consider the circumstances surround-
ing Khrushchev’s decision to break up the
&dquo;summit conference&dquo; which met in Paris on
May 16, 1960. The reader will recall that,
shortly after a Khrushchev &dquo;goodwill&dquo; visit
to the United States, the Soviets shot down
a U-2 spy plane over Russian territory. This
occurred on May 1, 1960. A frank and
unusual admission by President Eisenhower
that our planes were in fact flying over
Russia for spying purposes brought a bar-
rage of outraged attack on this US policy
by the Russians. Khrushchev then went to
Paris only long enough to demand an apol-
ogy from President Eisenhower for the U-2
flights. Not obtaining such an apology, he
left the conference and withdrew his coun-
try’s invitation to President Eisenhower to
visit the USSR. Such, in brief outline, are
the well-known facts of the U-2 affair and
its immediate aftermath.
Among the questions which may be asked
about these events are the following: (1)
Why did Khrushchev decide to precipitate
a break-up of the long-awaited summit con-
ference ? (2) Could we have predicted
what Khrushchev was likely to do, prior to
his actual action in Paris?
Let us consider how one would approach
these problems of explanation and predic-
tion using a decision theory (utility-prob-
ability) framework. Presumably the re-
searcher could distinguish the most relevant
outcomes of alternative actions in the situa-
tion-e.g., increased threat of war, Khru-
shchev retaining his hold on the Soviet gov-
ernment, embarrassment of Eisenhower, de-
fending Soviet &dquo;honor,&dquo; etc. One would
then attempt to find out what the utility of
each relevant outcome was to the decision-
maker (Khrushchev) as well as his subjec-
tive probability that each possible outcome
would follow a given course of action. Ap-
propriate formulas which combined these
utilities and probabilities would then tell us
what move to expect Khrushchev to make.
How could we have known what Khru-
shchev’s utilities and subjective probabil-
ities were?5 At the time at which the de-
cisions in question were being made, it
is plain that those outside the Politburo
could not obtain this information from Mr.
Khrushchev himself. In fact, therefore, we
could not have used the utility-probability
approach to predict his action in advance
of occurrence. This is a very serious prac-
tical deficiency of the decision theory ap-
proach. However, ten or twenty years later
perhaps, one might gain access to relevant
Russian government records, including what
Khrushchev said at the crucial time. Per-
haps one might also be able to obtain a
fairly candid retrospective interview with
Khrushchev and with other people who
were involved in the decision-making meet-
ing. Such a post-facto analysis of decision-
making, though not using decision theory,
has been made for such important deci-
sions as the US decision to resist aggression
in Korea (R. Snyder and Paige, 1958) and
5 For the sake of simplicity, this discussion
assumes that it was Khrushchev and not a
group of persons who made the crucial deci-
sions. The actual historical facts may be some-
what different.
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for the decisions of European leaders in the
days just before World War I (e.g., Zinnes
et al., 1961 ) .
However, even if one could get decision-
makers to cooperate fully with the research-
ers, it is far from certain that one could
find out from them the real subjective util-
ities of relevant outcomes. The reason is,
as discussed previously, that the true utility
of some outcomes may not be fully con-
scious.
To return again to the example of the
U-2 affair, suppose that we had transcripts
of everything Khrushchev said to his asso-
ciates concerning the action he might take
at the Paris summit conference. It is un-
likely that he would have admitted that per-
sonal prestige had a high utility for him in
the circumstances. It is still less likely that
he would state that a desire to express his
anger at Eisenhower, to &dquo;get even&dquo; with
him for an alleged personal &dquo;doublecross,&dquo;
had a high utility for him. If such outcomes
of breaking up the summit conference did
have high utility for Khrushchev, this high
utility-especially for the outcome of re-
venge-may not have been fully conscious
or fully expressed to colleagues.
To adequately measure subjective utility
and subjective probability we would have
to make use of the more sophisticated meth-
ods which are beginning to be developed
for this purpose (e.g., Davidson and Sup-
pes, 1957; Suppes and Walsh, 1959). The
effort to measure utility has usually in-
volved some procedure whereby persons
choose between different options. For ex-
ample, in the notable Davidson and Sup-
pes approach to utility measurement, the
situation faced by the subject may be dia-
grammed as follows:
The entries in the table (x, y, u, v ) rep-
resent possible outcomes. If the subject
chooses Option 1, he has an even chance
of getting either x or y. If he chooses Op-
tion 2, he has an even chance of getting u
or v. Davidson and Suppes demonstrate
that where the subject is indifferent be-
tween the two options, i.e., chooses each
50 percent of the time, then the difference
in utility between x and v is equal to the
difference in utility between y and u.
In their empirical studies, Davidson and
Suppes had subjects choose between op-
tions which involved different sums of
money and different classical phonograph
records. Using the utility values obtained
by this method, along with measured sub-
jective probability values, the authors are
fairly successful in predicting further choice
behavior. Evidently, then, their measure-
ment of the utility of simple outcomes in
laboratory situations is reasonably good.
Now suppose we wanted to use this gen-
eral method to assess the relative utility to
Khrushchev of various outcomes, such as
personal political failure and war, at the
time of the 1960 summit conference. We
might wish to present him with options of
the following kind:
By getting Khrushchev to make mean-
ingful choice among a series of such op-
tions, we might theoretically be able to ob-
tain reasonably good measures of the rela-
tive utility to him of various outcomes.
171
There are, however, a number of obvious
problems in obtaining such choices. First,
one would hardly expect to get Khrushchev
to submit to such testing during the time
period that the options are most meaningful
(i.e., prior to the summit conference). But
even if one could, the choice between op-
tions such as illustrated would be hypo-
thetical and not real. This is because the
real outcomes among which Khrushchev
chooses contain many additional subout-
comes, each having its own utility. For ex-
ample, wrecking the summit conference
might not only risk war; it might also help
maintain Khrushchev’s leadership in Russia,
keep the Chinese in check, embarrass Eisen-
hower, etc. When presented with the nec-
essarily simplified and hypothetical options
shown above, Khrushchev might not ex-
press his real preference. To admit that he
really preferred Option 2 would be to ad-
mit that he gives greater weight to per-
sonal success than to the lives of millions of
his countrymen. This would be a difficult
admission to make even to himself. Similar
problems of the candidness of preference
would apply if Khrushchev were retrospec-
tively choosing among these options ten
years after the event.
In short, because of the practical diffi-
culties both of data collection and of the
partly-conscious nature of some motives, it
would be exceedingly difficult to measure
the subjective utilities which help deter-
mine actual national decisions-either be-
fore such decisions are made or afterward.
If this is true, it may help explain why,
despite the popularity of decision theory
ideas, no serious attempts have been made
to apply the utility-maximization principle
to the study of actual decisions.
A Possible Alternative Approach
to Decision-Making
It may be that the motivational theory
proposed by Atkinsons-one which is in
many ways similar to decision theory-
provides a more useful theoretical guide to
research in this area. Atkinson has pro-
posed and offered some experimental evi-
dence (Atkinson, 1957, 1958) in support
of the proposition that:
Aroused motive to perform act X = f ( Moti-
vational disposition X Incentive X Expectancy)
Motivational disposition represents a rela-
tively permanent disposition (personality trait)
to value incentives (rewards or punishments)
of a certain kind.
Incentive is the magnitude of the specific
reward or potential satisfaction offered should
the expected consequence of act X occur. In-
centives vary in the extent to which they sat-
isfy a particular motivational disposition.
Expectancy is indicated by the probability
that the performance of act X will have a cer-
tain consequence.
(In his most recent work, Atkinson [1964,
p. 279] discussed the need to add a Habit
variable to the motivational equation. Habit
is concerned with such things as whether
the response is one which the person has
performed frequently, and which therefore
has prominence in his repertoire.)
The key difference between this formu-
lation and that of decision theory is that
the &dquo;utility&dquo; term of decision theory is split
into two parts. One part, motivational dis-
position, is concerned with enduring needs
and values of the actor; the other part, in-
centive, is concerned with aspects of the
environment which are relevant to satisfy-
ing these needs or values. Motivational dis-
position X Incentive = Utility (Atkinson,
1961). Both theoretical models treat the
factor of probability (or expectancy) in
similar fashion.
6 Atkinson’s theoretical model is in the
mainstream of psychological work, having
strong similarities and explicit connections to
the work of Lewin, Tolman, and Rotter, as
well as to decision theory.
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Now in what ways does this modifica-
tion help in solving the research and mea-
surement problems which we have dis-
cussed ? It may be useful first to see how
we could use the M X I X E model to un-
derstand our illustration-Khrushchev’s de-
cision to precipitate a breakup of the sum-
mit conference. The theory directs our at-
tention away from the wholly subjective
variables of Khrushchev’s utilities to more
situationally-based variables-the incentives
facing him. We would therefore attempt
to assess the situation faced by Khrushchev




The variables of incentive and probabil-
ity in the Atkinson formula are not wholly
objective. It is the actor’s perception of the
incentives and probabilities which will de-
termine his behavior. Nevertheless, it may
be possible to handle this problem in an
adequate way without getting involved in
the difficulties associated with trying to ob-
tain subjective data. A possible solution is
to analyze the situation in terms of the in-
formation which is available to the deci-
sion-maker. Thus, in trying to predict
Khrushchev’s action at the 1960 summit,
we would attempt to determine what in-
formation is available to him concerning
matters such as the likely US response to
various actions; the likely Chinese response
to various actions; the likely response of
&dquo;world opinion,&dquo; etc. What concessions
concerning Berlin has the US indicated it
will agree to, or not agree to, if the sum-
mit meets? What have the Chinese said
in their government publications about how
they would interpret a Russian meeting
with Eisenhower in the face of the U-2
affair? Whom are the governments of neutral
countries blaming for the possible collapse
of the summit talks?
Not all of the information available to
Khrushchev was available to us at the time
of his decision to break up the summit con-
ference, and some of it may never be known
to us. For example, we do not know what
other members of the Soviet Politburo may
have told him about the probable domestic
repercussions of going ahead with the sum-
mit. However, the US government did
know at the time a great deal about the
situation faced by Khrushchev and the in-
formation available to him. We knew the
contents of the diplomatic exchanges be-
tween Washington and Moscow and be-
tween the other Western capitals and Mos-
cow. We knew that the Chinese press was
opposing Russian-Western accommodation;
that an international conference of Com-
munist parties, at which Russia would try
to maintain her control over the world
Communist movement, was to meet soon;
that the leaders and press of &dquo;neutral&dquo; na-
tions were urging on Khrushchev a certain
course; from ambassadors and intelligence
sources, we may even have known some-
thing of what was going on behind the
scenes in the Kremlin. On the basis of this
objective, even though incomplete, informa-
tion about the situation as it impinged on
Khrushchev, we could have attempted sys-
tematically to assess the incentives and
probabilities which accompanied each of
several courses of action open to him. We
could also have assessed the &dquo;availability&dquo;
of various response patterns on the basis of
Khrushchev’s previous behavior.
This proposed research strategy is similar
in some ways to that proposed by Fink.
After expressing some doubt about the cur-
rent feasibility of measuring subjective fac-
tors, Fink says:
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One approach which does not depend so di-
rectly on the motivational model starts with
the postulate that the behavioral outcome of
the deterrence situation is determined by the
total pattern of communicative influence at-
tempts (threats, promises, and suasion) di-
rected at A’s decision-makers after A threat-
ened to attack P. It can be assumed that
some of these messages will be favorable to
the attack, and that others will oppose it; it
can also be assumed that some countries will
not attempt to influence A in a particular case,
thus by default communicating permissiveness.
It can also be assumed that the impact of each
message will be a function of the power of its
sender; thus each message can be weighted
according to some index of the sender’s power,
and a weighted sum of favorable, unfavorable,
and permissive messages can be obtained. A’s
response can be predicted from the ratio of
the total strength of unfavorable messages to
the total strength of favorable messages, per-
haps modified by the total amount of per-
missiveness present in the situation. The link
between these factors and the motivational
model is contained in the assumption that Mo
[A’s motive not to attack P] is positively cor-
related with the total strength of unfavorable
messages, and that Ma [A’s motive to attack
P] is increased by the occurrence of favorable
messages and perhaps by the presence of per-
missiveness [Fink, 1965, p. 64].
The present proposal is similar to that of
Fink in suggesting the possible advantages
of relatively objective data. It differs from
Fink’s in proposing that all objective in-
formation confronting the decision-maker
(direct messages plus other information)
be considered and that these be analyzed
in terms of incentives and probabilities rel-
evant to different actions, rather than in
terms of favorableness or unfavorableness
toward those actions. This type of analysis,
while probably more difficult than what
Fink suggests, has the advantage of being
directly connected to a motivational theory.
Assessing Motivational Dispositions
A further important methodological prob-
lem in using the Atkinson theoretical ap-
proach is that of measuring the motivational
dispositions of the decision-maker. How
strong was Khrushchev’s motive for per-
sonal political tenure, as compared to his
motive to avoid war, or to &dquo;get even&dquo; with
Eisenhower? The incentives and probabil-
ities which we might isolate from situational
information have greatest meaning in rela-
tion to these and other motives.
The problems of getting good motiva-
tional measures-especially for noncaptive
subjects-are very great. Yet it may prove
possible to get such measures on the basis
of objective information. One approach is
to analyze projectively verbal materials-
such as informal interviews, speeches, ar-
ticles, letters, etc. A second, and perhaps
more promising, method is to analyze con-
ditions of reward and punishment in a
person’s past history which are known to
contribute to various motives. For example,
we might be able to assess the strength of
Khrushchev’s motivation to avoid war on
the basis of our knowledge of his past ex-
perience with war. Did he suffer personally
in the past wars? Did he lose a son? Did
he witness horrible scenes? His motivation
for personal success and achievement might
be assessed from knowledge of the learn-
ing conditions of his own childhood, if such
information is available; or if it is not, one
could rely on knowledge of the child-raising
practices of the Ukranian peasant society
from which he came.7
One can attempt to validate measures of
motives obtained by such indirect methods
against more direct measures like question-
7 Jerald Bachman has pointed out to the
author that if the researcher could measure
incentives and probabilities existing for the
decision-maker in a number of past choice
situations, he could then infer from actual
choices made (and the M &times; I &times; E formula)
what the strength of the motivational disposi-
tions were.
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naire responses or behavioral choices.8 Thus,
using subjects like college sophomores, one
might attempt to validate an indirect mea-
sure of strength of motivation for personal
success, derived from analysis of past learn-
ing conditions, against more direct ques-
tionnaire, projective, and behavioral data.
Such an indirect and validated motivational
measure could then be applied to the as-
sessment of actual world leaders like Khru-
shchev. It may be noted that validation
of objective measures of utility appear to
be less feasible. Whereas motivational dis-
positions (e.g., to achieve, to express anger)
are usually of a fairly general nature and
relevant to most people, utilities are con-
cerned with outcomes specific to given in-
dividuals. Since the utilities with which
Khrushchev might have been concerned
(e.g., keeping control of the world Com-
munist movement) were specific to his own
life situation, measures of these could not
be validated with data obtained from other
people.
Laboratory and Simulation Studies
In addition to its advantages over deci-
sion theory for measurement in practical
situations, use of the Atkinson M X I X E
model appears to offer some strategic ad-
vantages for laboratory studies. One ad-
vantage is that one is led to study sepa-
rately the effect on decision-making of sys-
tematic variations in situational rewards and
punishment (incentives) and of internal-
ized motives and values (motivational dis-
positions). A decision theory model, by en-
compassing both motive and incentive in
the concept of utility, directs our attention
away from separate consideration of situ-
ational and personal factors.
In this context, the M X I X E model
seems more appropriate for the exciting
new work on simulation of international
relations. Simulation may prove useful for
understanding the behavior of national de-
cision-makers and even for predicting such
behavior in advance. A major theoretical
and methodological problem in much sim-
ulation work is to &dquo;match&dquo; the simulation
participants with real national decision-
makers (e.g., Hermann and Hermann,
1962). Such a matching on motivational
dispositions fits smoothly into the M X I X
E theoretical framework, but is not explic-
itly taken into account in a utility-proba-
bility framework. Furthermore, for simula-
tion to be a valid method of understand-
ing the real world, &dquo;essential&dquo; features of
the real world must be represented in the
simulation. The M X I X E theoretical ap-
proach provides a possible theoretical ra-
tionale for isolating these essential features
-i.e., in terms of the incentives and prob-
abilities in the situation. It may prove use-
ful to conceptualize the situation in terms
of these variables, thus linking our con-
ceptualization of the situation directly to a
motivational theory.
Summary and Conclusions
This paper has considered problems in
the use of decision theory as a theoretical
tool for predicting and explaining the be-
havior of national decision-makers.
First, some evidence indicating the possi-
ble importance of nonpragmatic, so-called
&dquo;irrational&dquo; factors in decision-making was
reviewed. The significance of the uncon-
scious or partly-conscious nature of many
nonpragmatic motives was indicated. It
was pointed out that writers who use de-
cision theory to explain national decision-
making have tended not to take account of
utilities which are not deliberately consid-
ered and weighed by the decision-maker.
8 That childhood learning conditions may be
clearly related to adult motives is demonstrated
by work on the achievement motive (see Mc-
Clelland et al., 1953).
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It was argued that while decision theory
could incorporate partly-conscious motives
into its theoretical framework, there are
formidable operational problems of measur-
ing partly-conscious utilities. These mea-
surement problems complicate already seri-
ous operational problems encountered by
a decision theory analysis-problems of
gaining access to the data required to as-
sess the subjective variables of utility and
probability.
An alternative, though similar, analytic
approach was proposed which makes use
of Atkinson’s theory of motivation. The
variables of motivational disposition, incen-
tive, and expectancy in this theory are also
ultimately subjective variables. However,
it was argued that they are easier to es-
timate by objective methods than is the
variable of utility. Other advantages of the
research strategy proposed are that it en-
ables us to analyze separately the effects
of situational and personal variables and
that it may be of more help in simulation
studies.
What has been proposed is a rather gen-
eral research strategy. To test its effective-
ness, considerable work would have to be
done on some of the operational problems
mentioned-especially the assessment of
incentives, probabilities, and motivational
dispositions from objective data. It may
turn out that the measurement problems
using such a theory are also too great for
this approach to be of practical use. Or
further work may reveal the need for re-
vision of the theory or use of a better the-
ory. However, it appears that work in this
general direction-of using theories whose
variables appear fairly susceptible to mea-
surement and of separating situational from
subjective factors-promises greater even-
tual payoff in explanation and prediction
than does the decision theory approach
which is currently so popular.
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